510-595-4661
Greens@richmondgreens.net

Tue 10/01/02
by Patrick S. Barrett and
Robert W. McChesney
GreenPages, Vol 5, No.3
We base this memo on three presuppositions. First, the United States desperately needs a viable progressive third party. Second, the Green Party has already demonstrated that it is the most promising third party project to emerge in the U.S. in the last fifty years, if not longer. Third, unless there is a crucial change in Green Party strategy, its prospects for success are very poor.
Indeed, without such a change, it will probably be a forgettable, entirely marginal operation within a decade.
Points one and two are beyond dispute. This memo therefore deals with the third presupposition, which may be more controversial. Why are the Green Party's prospects so poor?
One reason is that despite the substantial headway it has made in just a few short years, it has a long way to go before it develops into a well-organized operation with the capacity to vie for political power. Obviously, building such an organization would require long years of sustained party-building efforts anywhere in the world. Unfortunately, the US political context does not allow for the adoption of a gradual, long-term party-building strategy. Even the most successful and well-organized third parties of the past did not survive more than two or three election cycles.
This is because all U.S. third party projects face a major structural threat to their existence: the plurality, winner-take-all electoral system. This electoral system "which killed previous third party experiments" is no less forgiving today. In fact, in this latest go-around, it has helped to create a perception among core progressive constituencies that the Greens are simply immature protest voters with no sense of the high stakes involved in electoral politics.
As a result, far too much of our time is wasted arguing about "wasted votes," rather than organizing around progressive issues and building a following that can contend for power. For far too many of the constituencies Greens need to reach (African-Americans, Latinos, women, environmentalists, labor) there is enough of a difference between Democrats and Republicans that they are unwilling to take Greens seriously. Now, we might adopt a "Screw you" attitude toward progressives who fail to see the light and persist in voting Democratic, but that would be self-defeating. Instead, it is our responsibility to demonstrate to these voters that voting Green actually makes sense. The problem is not merely that Greens spend a disproportionate amount of time talking about the flaws in the "lesser of two evils" argument rather than discussing the issues around which we wish to build. The problem is that any vision for the future that has the Green Party succeeding has to have many of the people currently voting Democratic voting Green.
Right now, however, we are on the path not only to foreclosing that possibility, but also to transforming those who should be our core supporters into our sworn enemies. Indeed, among the Democratic constituencies the Green Party would ultimately need to become a viable electoral force, there are many who are enraged by the Greens' perceived alliance with Republicans in dumping Democrats. Therefore, when we do outreach, unless we are dealing with people entirely alienated from the electoral system, we need to move beyond calls to vote one's conscience and work instead to lower the strategic risks of voting Green.
How can this be accomplished?
The solution is actually both quite simple and very realizable in the near future: Instant-runoff voting (IRV). In some sense we are preaching to the choir, for there is already strong support for IRV within the Green Party. However, IRV must be transformed from something that is a good idea and deserving of Green support into something that should be at the very core, if not the cornerstone, of Green political strategy.

For the Greens, the benefits of IRV are potentially enormous. With the spoiler effect eliminated, we would gain the support of millions of disgruntled Democratic voters, who would feel free to abandon the Democratic Party without any fear of electing the candidates whom they most fear. We would also gain the space we need to engage in the kind of long-term party-building effort that will enable us to contend for power. Moreover, we would benefit from an increase in voter turnout, especially among the millions of poor and working class voters who currently abstain from voting due to the absence of viable candidates that speak to their concerns. The Green Party would also shed its current negative image, and the animosity that many Democratic Party loyalists have toward Greens would be redirected toward their own party leadership. Indeed, something of an alliance between the Greens and progressive Democrats might result, as the emergence of a strong third party may provide the latter the leverage they need to prevail against their internal party rivals. The overall effect, in fact, might be to pull the entire party spectrum to the left, the Republicans included.

The prospects for instituting IRV in the U.S. are very good. IRV faces no constitutional obstacles and would not necessitate federal legislation. Efforts to replace plurality elections with IRV in state and federal races are already well underway in numerous states, including Alaska, New Mexico, Vermont, Washington, and California. Moreover, in March of this year, IRV was adopted by the city of San Francisco, backed by a broad coalition headed by Greens and Democrats.

Support for IRV might grow on the basis of its appeal to democratic principles alone. But it is more likely that its adoption will hinge primarily on the strategic efforts of the Greens and other "third" parties. This is the beauty of this strategy. The Greens do not need a lot of power to effect a dramatic change in the rules of the political game. With only a small following, we can turn the core problem of the current electoral system (the spoiler effect) into a strategic advantage by using it to force the adoption of IRV. In fact, the states where efforts to pass IRV have gone the furthest are precisely those states where a strong third party has created a spoiler effect by transforming a perennial winner into a loser.

The Greens should therefore put IRV at the very center of our strategic plans. We should fully embrace the role of spoiler, but at every opportunity, publicly and emphatically link it to the strategic objective of passing IRV legislation. Without any hesitation, Greens should run candidates, in races where incumbents are running unopposed or face very weak opposition. However, this is not where the real energy and effort should be concentrated. For while we will no doubt gain some needed attention by obtaining 35 percent of the vote in a race that would otherwise be uncontested, we won't make any real headway in advancing a reform of the electoral system. Instead, the most important battleground will be those races where the outcome is in doubt and the Greens can decide the election. Since the decision to institute IRV will be undertaken by state legislatures, the primary target should be state office-holders, particularly those who are in a position of power and can influence the flow of legislation.

To repeat, we need to be very candid about this by making clear that while we are spoilers, we are doing so with a very sound strategic, and fundamentally democratic, aim in mind. Moreover, we need to reach out to core progressive voting constituencies, explain to them what we are hoping to accomplish, and educate them about IRV. We should encourage organizations that represent these constituencies to push hard for IRV themselves. Even if these groups dislike the Greens, they could use IRV themselves to advance their interests. This will go a long way toward demonstrating that the Greens are genuinely concerned about their interests and working very deliberately to enable them to realize their goals.

We also need to refrain from running candidates against certain Democratic incumbents, including Dennis Kucinich, Jesse Jackson Jr., Paul Wellstone, and others. Whenever a Democrat falls into the gray area, the wise course is not to run against her or him, except in rare circumstances where that Democrat actually has the power to push through IRV reforms but is unlikely to do so without pressure. Otherwise, pick on the mainstream Democrats and the Republicans. While this is a more controversial stance and may require convincing some Green supporters, taking out these Democrats would do possibly irreparable damage to our party-building efforts. Whatever one may think of Wellstone, for example, he is no Al Gore, and if he or someone even more progressive were to go down, we would be on the permanent defensive and any headway we make with IRV among the progressive voting constituencies mentioned above would be lost.

Finally, we need to work in concert with the Libertarians and any other third party that is in the same boat as us. This is because the Democrats do not control every state.
Taking out Democrats where they are in the minority will do little to advance the cause of IRV, because they're not in a position to do much about it. Thus, in states where the Republicans are in power, they too need to be spoiled by a third party and the Greens are not in a position to play that role. This is the lesson of Alaska, where the Libertarians have succeeded in building Republican support for IRV and the Democrats are opposed. The Greens should therefore convene a summit with the Libertarians and Reform party to map out IRV strategy together. We all sink or swim together. We all share the belief that if we open up our electoral system and make it more responsive to voters' wishes, our parties will prosper.

By explicitly making IRV the cornerstone of our political strategy, the Greens can accomplish several objectives at once: Make a big splash by becoming the champions of
democratic reform; shed our negative image as unsophisticated protest voters by linking our spoiling efforts to a sound strategic objective; offer a solution that would appeal to progressive voting constituencies and that could promote an alliance between them and the Greens; implement a reform that could alter the political playing field in a very fundamental way and in relatively short order; and give the Green Party the space it requires to embark on the long-term process of party-building.

IRV therefore presents the Greens with an opportunity to make history. What we choose to do with this opportunity may well decide our own political fate, and quite possibly that of the nation. This mission is critical for the Greens, for without IRV, we don't see any route for success in the visible future.

Patrick S. Barrett is Administrative Director of the A. E. Havens Center for the Study of Social Structure and Social Change at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Robert W. McChesney is a research professor in the Institute of Communications Research and the Graduate School of Information and Library Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

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IRV movement hits bump in Alaska
Tue 10/01/02 by Dan Johnson-Weinberger, Illinois Green Party GreenPages, Vol 5, No.3
The momentum that had been building for instant-runoff voting (IRV) hit a snag in August, when the first proposal to use IRV for an entire state was defeated at the ballot box.

Alaska residents voted down Measure 1 by almost a 2 to 1 margin on Aug. 27. Green Party activists from across the United States mobilized for the IRV initiative in Alaska, with many state parties contributing checks of $200 and sending some of their best organizers to the state. Despite a vigorous, if under-funded, campaign, advocates fell short 64 percent to 34 percent. Opposition from the Democratic Party, the state League of Women Voters chapter and several newspapers, and a lack of understanding of the mechanics of IRV contributed to the defeat. The Alaska League's opposition was a surprise, as every state League that has studied IRV has taken a position in support.

Measure 1 would have implemented IRV for all federal races and most state races (the gubernatorial race would not have been affected) and replaced the plurality system in which the candidate with the most votes (but not necessarily a majority) wins the election. Currently used in San Francisco, Louisiana (for overseas ballots) and within the Utah Republican Party, as well as internationally in places like Ireland and Australia; instant runoff voting is a cost-effective way to require candidates to earn a majority of the vote without holding a second, separate runoff election.

Advocates in Alaska gathered more than 40,000 signatures in 1999 and 2000 to put Measure 1 on the ballot. The measure was endorsed by all parties except the Democrats in Alaska.